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Abstract. As a synthetic concept, the État de droit could designate those states guaranteeing predetermined 
principles corresponding to “the principles of the État de droit”. And even if not all principles are fully guaranteed, 
it is admissible anyway to consider either that a state is partially an État de droit, or an État de droit to a certain 
extent, or that a better guarantee of one of the principles could allow a lower guarantee of another one. The 
concept of État de droit would then have a material (and effective) existence and positivity in law. Unfortunately, 
neither the positive law nor the doctrine defines it precisely enough to make the identification of those “principles 
of the État de droit” easy. On the contrary, the positive law is either inexistent or contradictive and, in the latter 
case, it seems to make use of the notion not because of its content – whenever it has one – but because it appears 
like an expression summarizing the existence of other principles.
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1. INTRODUCTION
„Dagegen war es eine Illusion des Kolumbus, dass er einen neuen Seeweg nach Indien 
entdeckt habe. Der Anteil seines Wunsches an diesem Irrtum ist sehr deutlich.“1
As Kelsen stated, the concept of “État de droit” – if this is indeed the translation of 
“Rechtsstaat” – might be a pleonasm.2 To talk about “État de droit” could thus be a 
linguistic and legal mistake, because it refers to something that does not exist. Its use in 
legal doctrine or in positive legal statements could then represent an illusion: the desire to 
use a new word either for a new concept, which is actually an old one, or to define 
something apparently new (a legal category), but that actually already exists.
“Rule of law” and “État de droit” will be here studied only from and through a pure 
legal perspective and methodology. This means that the law is considered as “an order of 
human behaviour”,3 thus different from the other social orders (like the moral or religious 
ones) because of its coercive aspects.4 This implies some consequences like, first, the 
closure of the legal system: the law is a closed and organized system of norms, independent 
and different from other orders of rules.5 Second, the law regulates its own production, i.e. 
a norm is what another norm defines as a norm or, put differently, a norm is what fulfils the 
      *   Professor for Constitutional Comparative Law at the University of Rouen (France) and 
member of the CUREJ (EA 4703). E-mail: jean-philippe.derosier@univ-rouen.fr
1 Freud (1927): “It was an illusion for Columbus to think that he had discovered a new seaway 
to the Indies. The contribution of his desire to this mistake is very obvious.”
2 Kelsen (1960) 314: “Considering the State as a legal order, each State is a Legal-State 
[Rechtsstaat], this word is a pleonasm”.
3 Kelsen (1949) 3.
4 On this point, see Kelsen (1949) 3–29 and Kelsen (1960) 25–71.
5 Kelsen (1960) 228–282.
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conditions of validity set forth in another norm.6 Third, the study of legal concepts and rules 
implies such a study without any reference to external elements, i.e. phenomena not 
involved in a legal process. By using elements from other social orders, legal conclusions 
might be drawn from illegal premises, which is impossible because of the closure of the 
legal system.7
“Rule of law” and “État de droit” also have to be studied here from a French public 
law perspective. This could seem quite easy: in France, the concept should have a long 
history, given that it was introduced into the French legal system during the French 
Revolution in 1789 by the Declaration of Human and Citizen’s Rights’ article 16 (DHCR), 
stating that “Every society in which neither the guarantee of Rights is ensured, nor the 
separation of powers is determined, has no Constitution”. According to this article 16, 
a Constitution would thus have to, on the one hand, offer the citizens a guarantee of 
(fundamental) rights, ensuring that the actions of the State and its institutions are “ruled by 
the law” and, on the other hand, limit the powers thanks to the division of their exercise by 
different organs, which should offer, at least, a jurisdictional control. This article 16 being 
nowadays a full part of French positive constitutional law,8 we should conclude that the 
principle of the “Rule of law” is properly guaranteed and has been so for a long time in 
French law.
In any case, studying this concept and principle in French law, we face three 
difficulties: first, a paradox because the denial of the principle just after the French 
Revolution was based on the principle itself; second, the identification of the concept and 
the principle of “État de droit”; and third, its definition.
A kind of paradox: based on the principle of separation of powers, guaranteed by 
Article 16 DHCR, this last principle was questioned just after the Revolution by the 
prohibition, for the judicial power, to judge the Administration.9 This led to the consequence 
that the Administration had to judge its own actions: there was no independent judge able to 
review the Administration and Executive’s actions. This could be considered as a negation 
of the principle of “État de droit”, of the “State governed or ruled by law”.10
Identification of the “État de droit”: this difficulty should actually be considered as 
twofold. Firstly, a study of the French positive law soon reveals that “État de droit” is quite 
entirely absent in the French legal norms. It is neither in the Constitution, nor in any decree 
    6 Kelsen (1960) 196–209.
    7 This is the reason why Kelsen has called its theory a “pure theory of law”, Kelsen (1960) 
1 and Kelsen (1937) 231–241.
    8 The Preamble of the current Constitution (“of the 5th Republic”) expressly refers to it and the 
Conseil constitutionnel admitted in 1971 that this reference implies the DHCR has full constitutional 
value.
    9 See two statutes: 16th and 24th August 1790: “the judicial functions are distinct and will 
remain separate from the administrative functions for ever” and 16 fructidor An III (revolutionary 
calendar, corresponding to 2 September 1795): “Reiterated prohibition is delivered against the 
tribunals to review acts of the administration of any nature”. See also Van Lang (2005) 1760, Truchet 
(2005) 1767, Caillosse (2005) 1781.
10 According to a “general meaning” of the doctrine of the rule of law, one of the meanings of 
the latter is that “disputes as to the legality of acts of government are to be decided by judges who are 
independent of the executive”, Wade, Forsyth (2004) 21.
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or executive order. We can find it only in one Statute and in three articles of Codes11 and in 
one decision of the Conseil constitutionnel (the French constitutional court),12 four decisions 
of the Conseil d’État (the French supreme court for administrative matters)13 and five 
decisions of the Cour de cassation (the French supreme court for civil and criminal 
matters).14 Alternatively, does the expression “État de droit” correspond to “Rule of law” 
and, in other words, is “État de droit” the exact translation of “Rule of law”? This question 
of translation leads to the question of the definition of the concept of “État de droit” (and 
even of the definition of “Rule of law”), which is the third difficulty.
What does “État de droit” exactly mean? There is no definition in French positive law 
(cf. second difficulty) and there are a lot of doctrinal definitions, often different from each 
other.15
Facing those three difficulties, the analysis of the French legal concept of “État de 
droit” might be more complex than it initially seems. Even if the expression is missing, the 
concept could exist but it is then possible to identify it only thanks to a precise definition. 
And this is another difficulty inherent in this expression: a lack of a precise definition 
(cf. difficulty no. 3). The “État de droit” remains then only an “allo-synthetic” concept, 
i.e. a concept synthesizing other concepts but of a variable content.16 The analysis of such a 
concept requires, first, to identify its definition (1) in order to focus, second, on its use in 
French public law (2).
11 Article 1, Loi d’orientation et de programmation relative à la politique de développement et 
de solidarité international, 2014-773, 7th July 2014, JORF 8th July 2014 p. 11242: the French 
development’s and international solidarity’s politics ensure “the promotion of the values of the 
democracy and of the État de droit”; Article L. 741-4, Code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et 
du droit d’asile: “a country is considered as [a safe country] if it ensures the respect of the principles 
of liberty, of democracy and of the État de droit, such as human rights and fundamental freedoms”; 
Article R. 311-22 of the same Code: “The civic education mentioned in the article L. 311-9 includes 
the presentation of the French institutions and of the values of the Republic, especially concerning the 
equality between men and women, the secular principle, the État de droit, the fundamental freedoms 
[…]”; annex Article after Article D. 122-3, Code de l’éducation: “Scholars must learn how to 
distinguish between the universal principles (the human rights), the rules of the État de droit (the 
statute [loi]) and social practices (the civility)”.
12 Decision n. 89-261 DC, 28th July 1989.
13 CE 10th October 2014, n. 375474, T.; CE 4th march 2013, n. 356490; CE 16th July 2014, 
n. 360665; CE Référé 9th December 2005 n. 287777.
14 CCass Crim 26th November 2014, n. 13-81851; Crim. 11th March 2008, n. 07-82.484; Civ. 
2ème 21st April 2005, n. 04 10.953 and 17th February 2005, n. 03-20.679; Crim. 4th September 2002, 
n. 01-81.481. Nota bene: in this statistic study, all the decisions referring to the “État de droit” because 
they are quoting either the arguments of the parties or provision of positive law (such as the above-
mentioned codified articles) have not been taken into account.
15 See Jouanjan (2003) 649–653.
16 With this neologism a “synthetic” concept is understood, i.e. a concept of which the content 
corresponds to a plurality of “things” (here: of normative principles), to their combination (e.g. the 
concept C corresponds to the combination of the principles X, Y and Z or C = X + Y + Z), and a 
concept of which the content is variable, i.e. it is not always referring to the same combination 
(e.g. the concept C corresponds to the combination of the principles X, Y and Z or to the combination 
of the principles V, W and Z or to the combination of the principles V, W and Y or even to the 
combination of the principles V, W, X, Y and Z: C = X + Y + Z = V + W + Z = V + W + Y = V + W + 
X + Y + Z). “Allo”, a word of ancient Greek origin, means “other” and thus suggests the idea of 
(a possibility of) “another synthesis”, i.e. a synthesis of a variable content.
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2. THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF “ÉTAT DE DROIT”
The concept of “État de droit” is here studied from a French public law perspective because 
we have assumed that it is the translation of the one of “Rule of law”. This consideration 
remains however a presupposition, which needs to be verified, especially because the 
English concept is not always translated in the same way into French. Therefore, by the 
identification of the concept as it could be perceived in French positive law and by the 
French legal doctrine, we might be confronted with a double difficulty: its translation (2.1) 
as well as its definition (2.2).
2.1. The Translation of the Concept: “Rule of Law” and “État de Droit”
The concept of “Rule of law” could be considered as an abbreviated form of the expression 
of “a state ruled by (the) law”. Understood as such, it could, and even should, be translated 
into French as “règne du droit”, literally “the reign of the law”.17 Albert Venn Dicey was 
talking about “the rule or supremacy of law” understood as “the security given under the 
English constitution to the rights of individuals looked at from various points of view”.18 
It has to be noted here that, in the traditional English expression, there is no use of the term 
“state”, like in the French or the German ones (and many others, all being actually a 
translation of the German term “Rechtsstaat”).19
Despite this, many official texts, such as international conventions written down 
officially in both languages, are translating “État de droit” into “Rule of law” and vice 
versa. One of the well-known examples is the European Union law: the Preamble and 
articles 2 and 21 of the Treaty on European Union and the Preamble of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights refer to the “État de droit” in the French version whereas the “Rule of 
law” in the English one. The same is true of the United Nations.20
There is however one notable exception: the Council of Europe and the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. In the 
Preamble of the latter, the English expression “rule of law” is translated into French by 
“prééminence du droit” (literally, “pre-eminence – or supremacy – of the law”).21 According 
to this, use of the expression of “Rule of law” in the decisions of the European Court on 
Human Rights is translated by “prééminence du droit” when “État de droit” is translated 
either by “law-governed State” or by “State based on the rule of law” or by “state subject to 
the rule of law”.22
17 Heuschling (2002) 165–175 and Heuschling (2009); see also Souvignet (2012).
18 Dicey (1959) 184. Dicey considered the rule of law as a characteristic of the English 
constitution through three meanings, Dicey (1959) 187–203.
19 Luc Heuschling (2009) 44. 
20 See the Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of law and Transitional Justice in 
Conflict and Post-Conflict societies, S/2004/616: “for the United Nations, the rule of law refers to a 
principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including 
the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and 
independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and 
standards”, where “rule of law” is translated into “État de droit” in the French official version.
21 The same is true of the Preamble of the Statute of the Council of Europe.
22 Report by Erik Jurgens, L’expression “principle of Rule of law”, 2nd July 2007, doc. 11343, 
Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe, Annex I; on those questions, see also Souvignet (2012).
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A convergence or a divergence of translations can only be established thanks to the 
conceptual definition of the translated expression. This might then be quite difficult because 
of a lack of convergence on the conceptual definitions of both “État de droit” and “Rule of 
law”.23 In any case, if we agree on a “basic core notion” of the latter, meaning that “all 
persons must be subject to law, and government must take place according to law”,24 the 
conceptual definition of “État de droit” we can find should permit a correspondence 
between the French and the English expressions.
2.2. The Search for a Useful Definition of the Concept: a Synthetic Concept
According to the scholarship here joined, the one of the “normativism”, the conceptualization 
of a specific concept of “État de droit” should be impossible: it is a pleonasm. Indeed, if 
we agree with the definition of the State as a legal order, there is then no place for a dualism 
between law and State. This definition is given by Kelsen for a theoretical reason: “a number 
of individuals form a community only because a normative order regulates their mutual 
behaviour. The community […] consists in nothing but the normative order regulating the 
mutual behaviour of the individuals. The term ‘community’ designates only the fact that the 
mutual behaviour of certain individuals is regulated by a normative order. […] Since we 
have no reason to assume that there exist two different normative orders, the order of the 
State and its legal order, we must admit that the community we call ‘State’ is ‘its’ legal 
order”.25
The State is thus a legal order, which would imply that the public authorities (the 
authorities of the State, its “organs”) exist only through a normative statement: an authority 
has no “sociological” existence but only a normative one, and it “exists” only through these 
norms stating which are its competences, i.e. what kind of norms this authority can enact, 
according to which procedure. Any authority, any State is so ruled by the law, any State is 
an “État de droit”.
This is the reason why this concept has to be considered as a pleonasm. Nevertheless, 
a pleonasm can either be a grammatical and then, in this case, a conceptual mistake, or 
constitute an insistence. Considered as a grammatical and conceptual mistake, the concept 
is useless: the State (“État”) is nothing else but the law (“droit”) and the concept of “État” 
exactly corresponds to the one of “État de droit”. But considered as an insistence, the 
concept may have another significance. This leads to the distinction between the formal and 
the material definition of the concept: when the first corresponds to the idea of the legal 
regulation of any public action and is then useless, corresponding to the concept of “État”, 
the second implies “something more” because it suggests that some States could be 
something other than an “État de droit”.26 The pleonastic concept considered as an 
insistence would then imply that there is a category of States which we can qualify as “États 
de droit”, assuming some material characteristics, distinguishing it from other categories of 
States without these characteristics.27
We then have to identify these characteristics. The doctrine agrees on a plurality of 
principles, which might be included in the concept of “État de droit”: the concept should 
23 Concerning the “Rule of law”, see Pollard, Parpworth, Hughes, (2007) 42–43.
24 Pollard, Parpworth, Hughes, (2007) 42–43.
25 Kelsen (1949) 182.
26 On this distinction, see Jouanjan (2003) 649–653; Pfersmann (2001) 66–78.
27 Pfersmann (2001) 59–61.
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then be considered as a synthetic one, corresponding to the synthesis of others. Some 
authors maintain that “État de droit” refers to a certain conception of the State including 
the separation of powers and the legal limitation of public action, democratic legitimacy, 
the guarantee of fundamental rights and freedoms, the judicial and the constitutional 
review.28 Others protest that it also includes the principles of legality, proportionality, 
predictability, some procedural guarantees, the right to a fair trial, etc.29
So considered, the concept could be useful: a State could be qualified as an “État de 
droit” if pre-determined characteristics are present. If they are, the State is an “État de 
droit”; if they are not, it is not. But things are not so simple because, as soon as a concept 
refers to a plurality of others and is defined as the synthesis of them, we could then imagine 
that not all, but only some, of those pre-determined characteristics are effectively 
guaranteed.30 Does this imply that the concept itself is then lacking? Or, on the contrary, 
that its content is variable? Its use in positive law can offer us the answer.
3. THE USE OF THE CONCEPT OF “ÉTAT DE DROIT” IN FRENCH (PUBLIC) 
LAW
As noted above, French positive law does not mention the “État de droit”, but a lack of the 
term does not necessarily mean a lack of the concept. In any case, an analysis of the 
Constitutional Council’s decisions reveals that the concept is not guaranteed at the 
constitutional level either. Nevertheless, this (non-)use in positive law (3.1) is 
counterbalanced by abuse of it by the authors and (3.2), revealing the lack of clarity of the 
conceptual meaning of this concept.
3.1. The (Non-)Use in Positive Law
Even if there are only four legal positive norms and ten decisions of the Supreme Courts31 
mentioning the “État de droit”,32 the concept itself or its content might be guaranteed 
without the presence of the terms. This is the case, for example, in Article 20 of the German 
Basic Law, where there is no mention of any “Rechtsstaat”, although the Constitutional 
Court holds that “many principles are listed in article 20 BL, though not the ‘principle of 
the Rechtsstaat’, but only some precise elements of this principle of Rechtsstaat”.33 This is 
also the case with the principle of human dignity, which the French Constitution does not 
expressly mention at all, but the Constitutional Council considered to be implicitly listed in 
the Preamble of the 1946 Constitution to which the current 1958 Constitution is referring.34
28 On these points, see Chevallier (2010) especially 51–58, 77–84, 96–110.
29 Jouanjan (2003) 649, 650. In German law, Katharina Sobota has identified 25 possible 
significations of the Rechtsstaat, Sobota (1997) 27–253, themselves sub-divided into 142 possible 
elements.
30 Pfersmann (2001) 60.
31 By “Supreme Courts” we understand the Conseil constitutionnel, Cour de cassation and 
Conseil d’État; on their competences: see above, Introduction. In this statistic, the decisions referring 
to “État de droit” through a quotation of one of the three legal positive norms or of one the litigants’ 
arguments are excluded.
32 See above, Introduction, difficulty No. 2.
33 15 December 1970, 2 BvF 1/69, 2 BvR 629/68 et 308/69, BVerfGE 30, 1 [24].
34 Decision No. 94-343/344 DC, 27 July 1994.
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But this is not the case with the “État de droit”. The Constitutional Council seems to 
refuse to make it correspond to any constitutional principles, like those guaranteed in Article 
16 DHCR (on this article: see above, Introduction: the guarantee of (fundamental) rights 
and the principle of the separation of powers).35 If, for example, the right to a fair trial 
derives from this article,36 the Council considered that, when the plaintiffs were arguing, 
a statute would be “the negation of the État de droit” and of some of the principles it 
implies, and that such arguments are not based on the violation of constitutional principles. 
This should then mean that those principles corresponding to the État de droit are not 
constitutional ones.
Alternatively, the judicial or administrative judge refers to the notion of “État de 
droit” only in order to argue that this “État de droit” implies something “more” or, in other 
words, because France is actually such an “État de droit”, some rights have to be 
guaranteed. The criminal judge thus states that, in an État de droit, the rights of the defence 
and some minimal procedural guarantees have to be preserved, from which statement we 
could infer that the État de droit implies the guarantee of those principles.37 But in that 
case, the principles of the État de droit should then be constitutional ones – because those 
rights of the defence and minimal procedural guarantees are on a constitutional level38 – 
which they are not, according to the Constitutional Council’s decision mentioned above. 
This is very confusing and not really helpful for the definition of the concept of État de 
droit and the determination of its possible content.
We should then finally ask: does the use of the notion and the existence of the concept 
imply the existence of those other principles or does the existence of those principles imply 
the use of the notion? This is an important question because, in the first case, the concept of 
the État de droit would have a real content and an effective positivity in law; in the second 
case, it is nothing except what it refers to and is, eventually, just an expression. Its use by 
the doctrine could help us to find an answer.
3.2. The (Ab)Use by the Doctrine
As a synthetic concept, the État de droit could be useful: it designates those states 
guaranteeing predetermined principles corresponding to “the principles of the État de 
droit”. And even if not all principles are fully guaranteed, it is admissible anyway to 
consider either that a state is partially an État de droit, or an État de droit to a certain extent, 
or that a better guarantee of one of the principles could allow a lower guarantee of another 
one. The concept of État de droit would then have a material (and effective) existence and 
positivity in law.
Unfortunately, neither the positive law – as shown above – nor the doctrine defines it 
precisely enough to make the identification of those “principles of the État de droit” easy. 
On the contrary, the positive law is either inexistent or contradictive and, in the latter case, 
it seems to make use of the notion not because of its content – whenever it has one – but 
because it appears like an expression summarizing the existence of other principles. But it 
35 Decision No. 89-261 DC, 28 July 1989.
36 Decision No. 2004-510 DC, 20 January 2005.
37 Crim. 4th September 2002, n. 01-81.481.
38 Decisions No. 76-70 DC, 2 December 1976, 86-224, 23 January 1987, 93-325 DC, 12 and 13 
August 1993.
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is then difficult to build a coherent and useful definition of it, of its possible content and of 
its legal quality because it does not seem to refer always to the same specific content.
The situation is analogous concerning the use of the doctrine, not because of a non-use 
(or an insufficient and contradictive use), like in positive law, but because of an abuse: 
without giving any (precise) definition, many authors state that this principle confirms the 
existence of an État de droit in France or the guarantee of this other principle reinforces the 
guarantee of the État de droit, etc.39 It finally appears to be a (quite) impossible and useless 
task to summarize all the uses of the notion and all the principles it might contain. Some 
authors, who have done so, or at least tried, have stated that it is a concept of evolving 
outlines.40 Its content is then not always the same and it varies from time to time: this is the 
reason why it as an allo-synthetic concept, a concept of a various and unstable content and, 
for this reason, a useless concept because of its imprecision.
We should finally consider one last question: is it possible to reduce its content to 
those core principles that are absolutely necessary to qualify a legal order as an État de 
droit? These principles could then be (1) the legal limitation of any public action (and the 
conformity to the law), (2) the guarantee of the fundamental rights and (3) a certain degree 
of separation of powers implying in particular the existence of a separate and independent 
(judicial) control. Nevertheless, some arguments can be found against this.
First, it has already been shown that such a legal limitation of the public action only 
corresponds to the positivity of the law itself and its existence. Here, État de droit refers 
only to État or to droit because État and droit are identical. Second, the rare norms of 
French positive law mentioning the “État de droit” also mention the fundamental rights, 
implying that there should be a difference between those two elements.41 Third, the principle 
of the separation of powers and/or the existence of an independent judge has its own 
existence and does not need to be included in another one. The possible pedagogic argument 
that might be invoked to justify the use of État de droit as a synthetic concept is here 
unjustified because it is unnecessary.
To conclude, either “État de droit” is a synthetic concept with no real interesting 
content (because it is either imprecise or quite empty), or it is an allo-synthetic one, useless 
because of the imprecision and variability of its content. In any case, existing only through 
its variable and unidentified (or unidentifiable, as we should say) contents, such a concept 
remains what it originally was: just an illusion.
39 There are so many bibliographical references that it would be both useless and impossible to 
report them all here. An interesting analysis has been done by Professor Chevallier, État de droit. 
Among others (ordered alphabetically), for an approach of the “État de droit” as a very diversified 
and variable concept, see also Chaltiel (2009) 3–8 (the cancellation of provisions without any link to 
the topic of a statute makes the latter more intelligible and guarantees the “État de droit”); Hanicotte 
(2010) 9–14 (no definition of “État de droit”, just a distinction between “État de droit” and “État 
policier”); Herrera (2009) 179–199 (existence of a “social État de droit”); Lafaille (2010) 771–787 
(principle of secularity considered as an element of the “État de droit”); Nivard (2010) 7–12 
(association of the principle of legal security to the “État de droit”). Articles on the introduction of the 
new procedure of “question prioritaire de constitutionnalité”, i.e. the new possibility for litigants to 
question the constitutionality of statutes, as a reinforcement of the “État de droit” has not been taken 
into account.
40 Carpano (2005) 24; see also Chevallier (2010) 10, 116 and Heuschling (2009) 54–55.
41 Article L. 741-4 Code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile: see above.
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